Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't by Frederic S. Mishkin
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't
Volume Author/Editor: Frederic S. Mishkin, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-53188-0
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/mish01-1
Conference Date: January 13-15, 2000
Publication Date: January 2001
Chapter Title: Prudential Supervision: Why Is It Important and What Are
the Issues?
Chapter Author: Frederic S. Mishkin
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10756
Chapter pages in book: (p. 1 - 30)Frederic S. Mishkin is the Alfred Lerner Professor of Banking and Financial Institutions
at the Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, and a research associate of the
National Bureau of Economic Research. He is a former director of research and executive
vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
The author would like to thank Allen Berger, Mark Carey, Mark Flannery, Patricia Jack-
son, Randall Kroszner, and other conference participants for their helpful comments. Any
views expressed in this paper are those of the author only and not those of Columbia Univer-




Why Is It Important and
What Are the Issues?
Frederic S. Mishkin
1.1 Introduction
Prudential supervision, broadly construed, involves government regula-
tion and monitoring of the banking system to ensure its safety and sound-
ness. This conference volume contains papers that examine prudential
supervision: What works and what doesn’t. To understand the importance
of this topic, it is worth taking a step back and examining more basic
questions: Why is prudential supervision so important, and why does it
take the form it does? This chapter introduces this volume by doing ex-
actly this.
To understand why getting prudential supervision right is so crucial to
the eﬃcient functioning of the ﬁnancial system, ﬁrst we need to know how
asymmetric information plays a key role in the way the ﬁnancial system
operates. This chapter ﬁrst outlines what problems asymmetric informa-
tion creates for the ﬁnancial system and shows that the presence of asym-
metric information explains why banks are so important. The chapter then
goes on to explain why prudential supervision of these institutions is
needed, and what forms it takes.
The chapter ends by outlining the key issues in the design of prudential
supervision and uses them to organize a general discussion of the papers
1in this volume, providing a brief overview of their contents. The linkages
between these papers are explored in order to highlight some general con-
clusions.
1.2 The Role of Asymmetric Information in the Financial System
The ﬁnancial system is critical to the health of the economy because it
performs the essential function in an economy of channeling funds from
savings to those individuals or ﬁrms that have productive investment op-
portunities. If the ﬁnancial system does not perform this role well, then the
economy cannot operate eﬃciently, and economic growth will be severely
hampered. A crucial impediment to the eﬃcient functioning of the ﬁnan-
cial system is asymmetric information, a situation in which one party to a
ﬁnancial contract has much less accurate information than the other party.
For example, borrowers who take out loans usually have much better in-
formation about the potential returns and risks associated with the in-
vestment projects they plan to undertake than do lenders. Asymmetric
i n f o r m a t i o nl e a d st ot w ob a s i cp r o b l e m si nt h eﬁnancial system: adverse
selection and moral hazard.
Adverse selection is an asymmetric information problem that occurs
before the transaction because lower-quality borrowers with higher credit
risk are the ones who are most willing to take out a loan or pay the highest
interest rate. Thus, the parties who are most likely to produce an undesir-
able (adverse) outcome are most likely to be selected. For example, those
who are poor credit risks are likely to be the most eager to take out a loan
and pay a high interest rate because they know that they are unlikely to
pay it back. Because adverse selection makes it more likely that loans
might be made to bad credit risks, lenders may decide not to make any
loans even though there are good credit risks in the marketplace. This
outcome is a feature of the classic “lemons problem” analysis ﬁrst de-
scribed by Akerlof (1970). Clearly, minimizing the adverse selection prob-
lem requires that lenders screen out good from bad credit risks.
Moral hazard occurs after the transaction takes place because the
lender is subjected to the hazard that the borrower has incentives to engage
in activities that are undesirable from the lender’s point of view—that is,
activities that make it less likely that the loan will be paid back. Moral
hazard occurs because a borrower has incentives to shift into projects with
high risk in which the borrower does well if the project succeeds but the
lender bears most of the loss if the project fails. Also, the borrower has
incentives to misallocate funds for his or her own personal use, to shirk
and just not work very hard, or to undertake investment in unproﬁtable
projects that increase his or her power or stature. The conﬂi c to fi n t e r e s t
between the borrower and lender stemming from moral hazard implies
that many lenders will decide that they would rather not make loans, so
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formation is clearly not the only source of the moral hazard problem.
Moral hazard can also occur because high enforcement costs might make
it too costly for the lender to prevent moral hazard even when the lender
is fully informed about the borrower’s activities.) To minimize the moral
hazard problem, lenders must impose restrictions (restrictive covenants)
and other contract terms on borrowers so that borrowers do not engage in
behaviors that make it less likely that they can pay back the loan; then
lenders must monitor the borrowers’ activities and enforce the restrictive
covenants if the borrower violates them.
Another concept that is very important in understanding the impedi-
ments to a well-functioning ﬁnancial system is the so-called free-rider
problem. The free-rider problem occurs because people who do not spend
resources on collecting information can still take advantage of (get a free
ride oﬀ) the information that other people have collected. The free-rider
problem is particularly important in securities markets. If some investors
acquire information that tells them which securities are undervalued and
then buy these securities, other investors who have not paid for this infor-
mation may be able to buy right along with the well-informed investors. If
enough free-riding investors can do this, the increased demand for the
undervalued securities will cause their low price to be bid up to reﬂect the
securities’ full net present values given this information. As a result of all
these free riders, investors who have acquired information will no longer
be able to earn the entire increase in the value of the security arising from
this additional information. The weakened ability of private ﬁrms to proﬁt
from producing information will mean that less information is produced
in securities markets, so that the adverse selection problem, in which over-
valued securities are those most often oﬀered for sale, is more likely to be
an impediment to a well-functioning securities market.
More important, the free-rider problem makes it less likely that securi-
ties markets will act to reduce incentives to commit moral hazard. As we
have seen, monitoring and enforcement of restrictive covenants and other
contract terms are necessary to reduce moral hazard incentives for borrow-
ers to take on risk at the lenders expense. However, because monitoring
and enforcement are costly, the free-rider problem discourages this kind
of activity in securities markets. Once some investors know that other
securities holders are monitoring and enforcing the restrictive covenants,
they can free-ride on the other securities holders’ monitoring and enforce-
ment. When these other securities holders realize that they can do the
same thing, they also may stop their monitoring and enforcement activi-
ties, with the result that not enough resources are devoted to monitoring
and enforcement. The outcome is that moral hazard can be a serious hin-
drance to the issuance of marketable securities.
One important feature of ﬁnancial systems explained by the asymmetric
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role of banking has been in decline in both the United States and other industrialized coun-
tries because of improved information technology that makes issuing securities easier. None-
theless, banks continue to be important in the ﬁnancial system.
information framework is the prominent role played by banking institu-
tions and other ﬁnancial intermediaries that make private loans. These
institutions play such an important role because they are well suited to
reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems in ﬁnancial markets.
They are not as subject to the free-rider problem and proﬁt from the infor-
mation they produce because they make private loans that are not traded.
Because the loans of these institutions are private, other investors can-
not buy them. As a result, investors are less able to free-ride oﬀﬁnancial in-
termediaries and bid up the prices of the loans that would prevent the
intermediary from proﬁting from its information production activities.
Similarly, it is hard to free-ride oﬀ these monitoring activities of ﬁnancial
intermediaries when they make private loans. Financial institutions mak-
ing private loans thus receive the beneﬁts of monitoring and so are better
equipped to prevent moral hazard on the part of borrowers.
Banks have particular advantages over other ﬁnancial intermediaries in
solving asymmetric information problems. For example, banks’ advan-
tages in information collection activities are enhanced by their ability to
engage in long-term customer relationships and to issue loans using lines
of credit arrangements (Petersen and Rajan 1994; Berger and Udell 1995).
In addition, their ability to scrutinize their borrowers’ checking account
balances may provide banks with an additional advantage in monitoring
the borrowers’ behavior (Nakamura 1993). Banks also have advantages in
reducing moral hazard because, as demonstrated by Diamond (1984), they
can engage in lower cost monitoring than can individuals, and because, as
pointed out by Stiglitz and Weiss (1983), they have advantages in pre-
venting risk taking by borrowers because they can use the threat of cutting
oﬀ future lending to improve a borrower’s behavior. Banks also have ad-
vantages in contracting, that is, specifying interest rates, collateral require-
ments, and other contractual terms that help sort borrowers into risk pools
that reduce adverse selection and moral hazard incentives for borrowers
to engage in risky activities. Banks’ natural advantages in collecting infor-
mation and reducing moral hazard explain why banks have such an impor-
t a n tr o l ei nﬁnancial markets throughout the world.1 In addition, banks
have the advantage of the synergy from providing liquidity provision at the
same institution oﬀering line of credit lending and deposits (see Kashyap,
Rajan, and Stein 1999).
The asymmetric information framework explains why banks play an
even more important role in the ﬁnancial systems of emerging market and
transition countries because of the greater diﬃculty of acquiring informa-
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tion on private ﬁrms in these countries.2 When the quality of information
about ﬁrms is worse, asymmetric information problems will be more se-
vere, and it will be harder for ﬁrms to issue securities. Thus, the smaller
role of securities markets in emerging market and transition countries
leaves a greater role for ﬁnancial intermediaries such as banks.
1.3 Why is Prudential Supervision Needed?
The previous section shows how asymmetric information leads to ad-
verse selection and moral hazard problems that both have an important
impact on the ﬁnancial system and explain the importance of banks. The
same asymmetric information analysis is especially useful in understand-
ing why prudential supervision of the banking system is necessary and
why governments choose the types of supervision they do.
1.3.1 The Rationale for a Government Safety Net
As shown in the previous section, banks are particularly well suited to
solving adverse selection and moral hazard problems because they make
private loans that help avoid the free-rider problem. However, this solution
to the free-rider problem creates another asymmetric information problem
because depositors lack information about the quality of these private
loans. This asymmetric information problem leads to two reasons why the
banking system might not function well.
First, in the absence of government intervention, a bank failure means
that depositors would have to wait to get their deposit funds until the bank
is liquidated and its assets turned into cash, and at that time they would
be paid only a fraction of the value of their deposits. Unable to learn if
bank managers were taking on too much risk or were outright crooks, de-
positors would be reluctant to put money in the bank, thus making bank-
ing institutions less viable. Second, depositors’ lack of information about
the quality of bank assets can lead to bank panics, which can have serious
harmful consequences for the economy.
To see this, consider the following situation. After an adverse shock hits
the economy, 5 percent of the banks have such large losses on loans that
they become insolvent (i.e., they have a negative net worth and therefore
are bankrupt). Because of asymmetric information, depositors are unable
to tell whether their bank is a good bank or one of the 5 percent that are
insolvent. Depositors at bad and good banks recognize that they may not
get back 100 cents on the dollar for their deposits and will want to with-
draw them. Indeed, because banks operate on a sequential service con-
straint (i.e., a ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served basis), depositors have a very strong
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bank may run out of funds and they will get nothing. Uncertainty about
the health of the banking system in general can lead to runs on banks
both good and bad, and the failure of one bank can hasten the failure
of others (a contagion eﬀect). If nothing is done to restore the public’s
conﬁdence, a bank panic can ensue. Because banks solve asymmetric in-
formation problems and thus facilitate productive investment in the econ-
omy, a bank panic in which many banks go out of business reduces the
amount of ﬁnancial intermediation undertaken by banks and so leads to
a decline in investment and aggregate economic activity. Indeed, the most
severe economic contractions in U.S. history have always been associated
with bank panics (see Friedman and Schwartz 1963; Bernanke 1983; and
Mishkin 1991).
A government safety net for depositors can short-circuit runs on banks
and bank panics; and by providing protection for the depositor, it can
overcome reluctance to put funds in the banking system. One form of the
safety net is explicit deposit insurance, a guarantee such as that provided
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the United
States, in which depositors are paid oﬀ in full on the ﬁrst $100,000 they
have deposited in the bank, no matter what happens to the bank. With
fully insured deposits, depositors do not need to run to the bank to make
withdrawals—even if they are worried about the bank’s health—because
their deposits will be worth 100 cents on the dollar, no matter what.
Deposit insurance is not the only way in which governments provide a
safety net for depositors. Governments have often stood ready to provide
support to domestic banks when they face runs, even in the absence of
explicit deposit insurance. This support is sometimes provided by the
central bank, which operates as a lender of last resort, either by lending
directly to troubled institutions or by injecting liquidity into the ﬁnancial
system through open market operations (which may be less eﬀective). In
other cases, funds are provided directly by the government to troubled
institutions, or these institutions are taken over by the government, which
then guarantees that depositors will receive their money in full.
1.3.2 Moral Hazard and the Government Safety Net
Although a government safety net can be very successful at protecting
depositors and preventing bank panics, it is a mixed blessing. The most
serious drawback of the government safety net stems from moral hazard,
the incentives of one party of a transaction to engage in activities detri-
mental to the other party. Moral hazard is a prominent concern in govern-
ment arrangements to provide a safety net. Because depositors know that
with a safety net they will not suﬀer losses if a bank fails, they do not im-
pose market discipline on banks by withdrawing deposits when they sus-
pect that the bank is taking on too much risk. Consequently, banks with
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they otherwise would. The problem here is not just that a government
safety net exists, but that it results in a payoﬀ function for bank owners
that encourages excessive risk taking. If the insurance provided by the
safety net could be priced properly so that the payoﬀ for the bank would
no longer encourage excessive risk taking—obviously a tall order—then
the moral hazard problem would disappear.
1.3.3 Adverse Selection and the Government Safety Net
A further problem with a government safety net arises because of ad-
verse selection: The people who are most likely to engage in activities that
may cause bank failure are those who most want to take advantage of the
insurance. Because depositors who are protected by a government safety
net have little reason to impose discipline on the bank, risk-loving entre-
preneurs might ﬁnd the banking industry a particularly attractive one to
enter; they know that they will be able to engage in highly risky activities.
1.3.4 Too Big To Fail
Because the failure of a very large bank makes it more likely that a
major ﬁnancial disruption will occur, governments are naturally reluctant
to allow a big bank to fail and cause losses to its depositors and perhaps
to other stakeholders. Indeed, when large banks have failed (as happened
in the United States with the failure in May 1984 of Continental Illinois,
one of the ten largest banks in the United States at the time), governments
have often not only guaranteed insured deposits but also prevented losses
for uninsured deposits or even bondholders. (Note that the term too big to
fail is somewhat misleading because when a bank is closed or merged into
another bank, at least in the United States but not always elsewhere, the
managers are usually ﬁred, and the stockholders in the bank lose their in-
vestment.)
One problem with the too-big-to-fail policy is that it increases the moral
hazard incentives for big banks. If a government is willing to close a bank
and prevent losses only for insured depositors, uninsured depositors or
other creditors would suﬀer losses if the bank failed. Thus they would have
an incentive to monitor the bank by examining the bank’s activities closely
and pulling their money out if the bank were taking on too much risk. To
prevent such a loss of credit, the bank would be more likely to engage in
less risky activities. However, once uninsured creditors know that a bank
is too big to fail, they have no incentive to monitor the bank and pull out
their funds when it takes on too much risk; no matter what the bank does,
uninsured creditors will not suﬀer any losses. The result of the too-big-to-
fail policy is that big banks might take on even greater risks, thereby mak-
ing bank failures more likely. Boyd and Gertler (1993) ﬁnd evidence con-
sistent with this view: Large banks in the United States took on riskier
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large banks.
1.3.5 Rationale for Prudential Supervision
Because all governments provide some form of a safety net for the bank-
ing system, whether it is explicit or implicit, they need to take steps to
limit the moral hazard and adverse selection that the safety net creates.
Otherwise, banks will have such a strong incentive to take on excessive
risks that the safety net may do more harm than good and promote bank-
ing crises rather than prevent them. Prudential supervision, in which the
government establishes regulations to reduce risk taking and then supervi-
sors monitor banks to see that they are complying with these regulations
and not taking on excessive risk, is thus needed to ensure the safety and
soundness of the banking system. Preventing excessive risk taking with
prudential supervision is even more critical in emerging market countries,
as recent events have indicated. Inadequate prudential supervision has led
to severe problems in these countries’ banking sectors, which have been
an important factor triggering the currency and ﬁnancial crises in these
countries in recent years, and which have created so much economic hard-
ship (see Mishkin 1996, 1999; and Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini 1998).
1.4 Forms of Prudential Supervision
Prudential supervision takes on nine basic forms: (a) restrictions on
asset holdings and activities; (b) separation of the banking and other
ﬁnancial service industries such as securities, insurance, or real estate;
(c) restrictions on competition; (d) capital requirements; (e) risk-based de-
posit insurance premiums; (f) disclosure requirements; (g) bank charter-
ing; (h) bank examination; and (i) a supervisory versus a regulatory ap-
proach.
1.4.1 Restrictions on Asset Holdings and Activities
Even in the absence of a government safety net, banks still have the in-
centive to take on too much risk. Risky assets may provide the bank with
higher earnings if they pay oﬀ;b u ti ft h e yd on o tp a yo ﬀ and the bank
fails, depositors are left holding the bag. If depositors are able to mon-
itor the bank easily by acquiring information on its risk-taking activities,
they would immediately withdraw their deposits if the bank was taking on
too much risk. To prevent such a loss of deposits, the bank would be more
likely to reduce its risk-taking activities. Unfortunately, acquiring informa-
tion on a bank’s activities to learn how much risk the bank is taking can
b ead i ﬃcult task. Hence, depositors may be incapable of imposing disci-
pline that might prevent banks from engaging in risky activities. A ratio-
nale for government regulation to reduce risk taking on the part of banks
therefore exists even without the presence of a government safety net, such
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to discipline them, banks structured with more equity or subordinate claims would not rely
on depositors for discipline, and junior claimants might then be able to provide more of the
required discipline.
4. Preventing banks from holding individually risky assets does not necessarily reduce the
variance of their portfolios, and this is why regulators also focus on the overall riskiness of
the bank’s balance sheet and activities.
as deposit insurance.3 The need for restrictions on risky activities is even
greater when there is a government safety net that increases the incentives
for risky behavior.
Governments therefore impose banking regulations that restrict banks
from holding risky assets—common stock, for example, in the United
States—and these restrictions are a direct means of making banks avoid
too much risk.4 Bank regulations also promote diversiﬁcation, which re-
duces risk by limiting the amount of loans in particular categories or to
individual borrowers. Regulations also restrict banks from engaging in
commercial activities that are considered to be outside the core banking
business and that might subject the bank to too much risk.
1.4.2 Separation of Banking and Other Financial Service Industries
One particular type of activity that may involve more risk than tradi-
tional banking activities is underwriting securities. Concerns that moral
hazard incentives created by the government safety net might encourage
excessive risk in this business have led some governments to prevent the
combination of banking and securities activities. For example, the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933 forced a separation of the banking and securities in-
dustries in the United States until its repeal with the passage in 1999 of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act.
Another concern with banks engaging in other ﬁnancial activities such
as securities underwriting, insurance, or real estate is that these may lead
to extension of the government safety net in these industries also, even if
they are not inherently riskier than traditional banking. As we have seen,
expansion of the safety net could increase the incentives for risk taking in
nonbanking industries, which could make the ﬁnancial system more frag-
ile. In addition, extending the safety net to units of banking institutions
that engage in securities, insurance, and real estate activities might give
banking institutions an unfair competitive advantage in these industries
relative to companies not aﬃliated with banks. Thus, governments often
restrict banks from entering these other businesses in order to prevent
extension of the safety net.
1.4.3 Restrictions on Competition
Increased competition can also increase moral hazard incentives for
banks to take on more risk. Declining proﬁtability and hence a lower fran-
chise value as a result of increased competition could tip the incentives of
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levels (see Marcus 1984 and Keeley 1990). Thus, governments in many
countries have instituted regulations to protect banks from competition.
These regulations have taken four forms. First are regulations separating
banking and nonbanking business, like those in the Glass-Steagall legisla-
tion just mentioned, which prevent nonbank institutions from competing
with banks by engaging in banking business. Second are restrictions on
entry of foreign banks (or, in the United States, restrictions on entry of
out-of-state banks that occurred before implementation of the Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Eﬃciency Act of 1994). Third are re-
strictions on branching. Fourth are ceilings on rates charged on loans or
ceilings on rates charged on deposits, as with the Regulation Q restrictions
on deposit rates in the United States that were abolished in the mid-1980s.
Although restricting competition may prop up the health of banks, re-
strictions on competition have obvious serious disadvantages: They can
lead to higher charges to consumers and can decrease the eﬃciency of
banking institutions, which do not have to compete as hard (Berger and
Hannan 1998). Thus, although the existence of asymmetric information
provides a rationale for anticompetitive regulations, it does not mean that
they will be beneﬁcial. Indeed, in recent years the impulse of governments
in industrialized countries to restrict competition has been waning.
1.4.4 Capital Requirements
Requiring that banks have suﬃcient capital is another way to change
the banks’ incentives to take on less risk. When a bank is forced to hold a
large amount of equity capital, the bank has more to lose if it fails and is
thus more likely to pursue less risky activities.
Bank capital requirements typically take three forms. The ﬁrst type is
based on the so-called leverage ratio: the amount of capital divided by the
bank’s total assets. For example, to be classiﬁed as well capitalized in the
United States, a bank’s leverage ratio must exceed 5 percent; a lower lever-
age ratio—especially one below 3 percent—triggers prompt corrective ac-
tion with increased restrictions on the bank.
In the wake of banking problems in the 1980s, regulators in the United
States and the rest of the world have become increasingly worried about
banks’ holdings of risky assets and about the increase in banks’ oﬀ-
balance-sheet activities, particularly activities that involve trading ﬁnan-
cial instruments and generating income from fees, which do not appear on
bank balance sheets but nevertheless expose banks to risk. This led to
the establishment of a second type of capital requirements in 1988 that
attempted to make adjustments for risk, referred to as the Basel Accord
on bank capital requirements because they were agreed to by banking
oﬃcials from industrialized nations who met under the auspices of the
Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland. Under this
risk-based capital requirement, minimum capital standards are linked to
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interest-rate swaps, and trading positions in futures and options.
The Basel Accord required that banks hold capital of at least 8 percent
of their risk-weighted assets. Assets and oﬀ-balance-sheet activities were
allocated into four categories, each with a diﬀerent weight to reﬂect the
degree of credit risk. The ﬁrst category carried a zero weight and included
items that have little default risk, such as reserves and government securi-
ties in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries. The second category had a 20 percent weight and in-
cluded claims on banks in OECD countries. The third category had a
weight of 50 percent and included municipal bonds and residential mort-
gages. The fourth category had the maximum weight of 100 percent and
included credits to consumers and corporations. Oﬀ-balance-sheet activi-
ties are treated in a similar manner by assigning a credit-equivalent per-
centage that converts them to on-balance-sheet items to which the appro-
priate risk weight applies.
A third type of capital requirement was introduced in 1996 to cover risk
in trading activities at the largest banks. For example, since January 1998
the Federal Reserve has required these banks to use their own internal
models to calculate how much they could lose over a ten-day period and
then set aside additional capital equal to three times that amount. Banks
can meet this new capital requirement with more standard forms of capital
or by issuing a new form of capital, called Tier 3, which consists of short-
term securities that holders cannot cash in at maturity if the bank is under-
capitalized.
1.4.5 Risk-Based Deposit Insurance Premiums
As mentioned earlier, the government safety net creates a moral hazard
problem because it leads to a payoﬀ function for bank owners that encour-
ages excessive risk taking. The moral hazard problem could therefore be
eliminated if premiums for the insurance provided by the government were
priced appropriately to reﬂect the amount of risk taken by a bank. The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of
1991 pursued this approach to reducing the moral hazard problem by
mandating the implementation of risk-based deposit insurance premiums.
As a result, deposit insurance premiums in the United States are based on
bank’s classiﬁcations into one of three capital adequacy groups and one of
three supervisory groups. The higher capital adequacy is and the better
the bank’s supervisory rating is, the lower its insurance premium is.
Although risk-based deposit insurance premiums are desirable in the-
ory, they have not worked very well in practice. The basic problem is that
it is hard to determine accurately the amount of risk a bank is actually
taking. For example, at the beginning of 1999, 95 percent of the Bank
Insurance Fund institutions in the United States (with 98 percent of com-
mercial bank deposits) and 92 percent Savings Association Insurance
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charter from the Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency in the United States in the past,
Fund institutions (with 96 percent of savings and loan deposits) ended up
being put in the least risky insurance category, paying a zero insurance
premium. Clearly, the risk-based deposit insurance scheme in the United
States does not discriminate adequately among banks and has not pro-
vided the appropriate incentives to reduce risk taking.
1.4.6 Disclosure Requirements
The free-rider problem described earlier indicates that individual depos-
itors and other bank creditors will not have enough incentive to produce
private information about the quality of a bank’s assets. To ensure that
there is better information for depositors and the marketplace, regulators
can require that banks adhere to certain standard accounting principles
and disclose a wide range of information that helps the market assess the
quality of a bank’s portfolio and the amount of the bank’s exposure to
risk. More public information about the risks incurred by banks and the
quality of their portfolio can enhance market discipline by enabling stock-
holders, creditors, and depositors to evaluate and monitor banks and thus
act as a deterrent to excessive risk taking. Disclosure requirements can
also be the primary focus of a bank regulatory system, as with the ap-
proach implemented in New Zealand in 1996 in which every bank must
supply a comprehensive quarterly ﬁnancial statement to the public and
prominently post its rating from private credit agencies at all bank
branches. An unusual feature of the New Zealand system is that it requires
bank directors to validate ﬁnancial statements, and they are subject to
unlimited liability if the bank goes into bankruptcy and if these ﬁnancial
statements are found to be misleading.
1.4.7 Bank Chartering
Overseeing who operates banks is an important method for reducing
the adverse selection problem created by the government safety net. Be-
cause banks can be used by dishonest people or overly ambitious entrepre-
neurs to engage in highly speculative activities, such undesirable people
(from the safety and soundness perspective) would be eager to run a bank.
Chartering banks is one method for preventing this adverse selection prob-
lem; through chartering, proposals for new banks are screened to prevent
undesirable people from controlling them. The typical chartering process
requires the people planning to organize the bank to submit an application
that shows how they plan to operate the bank. In evaluating the appli-
cation, the chartering authority looks at whether the bank is likely to be
sound by examining the quality of the banks’ intended management, the
likely earnings of the bank, and the amount of the bank’s initial capital.5
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competition is no longer a feature of the chartering process in the United States.
6. For a description of the bank examination process in the United States, see the paper
by Berger, Kyle, and Scalise in this volume.
1.4.8 Bank Examination
To limit moral hazard incentives for excessive risk taking, it is not
enough to have regulations that encourage less risk taking, but banks must
be monitored to see if they are complying with these regulations. If not,
enforcement actions must be taken. Banks are required to ﬁle periodic
(usually quarterly) reports (called call reports in the United States) that
contain such information as the bank’s assets and liabilities, income and
dividends, ownership, and foreign exchange operations. Bank examiners
also evaluate the quality of a bank’s loans and classify them into problem
categories if they are unlikely to be repaid in order to assess the bank’s
balance-sheet position and the amount of its capital. This information,
along with regular on-site bank examinations, allows regulators to monitor
whether the bank is complying with capital requirements (including suﬃ-
cient provisioning for loan losses), restrictions on asset holdings, disclosure
requirements, and so on, and is crucial to limiting the moral hazard cre-
ated by the government safety net.6
In the United States, with variants in other countries, examiners give
banks a so-called CAMELS rating (the acronym is based on the six areas
assessed: capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity,
and sensitivity to market risk). With this information about a bank’s activi-
ties, regulators can enforce regulations by taking such formal actions as
cease and desist orders to alter the bank’s behavior or even by closing a
bank if its supervisory rating is suﬃciently low. Actions taken to reduce
moral hazard by restricting banks from taking on too much risk also help
reduce the adverse selection problem, because with less opportunity for
risk taking, risk-loving entrepreneurs will be less likely to be attracted to
the banking industry.
1.4.9 Supervisory versus Regulatory Approaches
Traditionally, prudential supervision has focused primarily on assess-
ment of the quality of the bank’s balance sheet and loans at a point in
time, then determining whether the bank complies with capital require-
ments and restrictions on asset holdings. Because this kind of prudential
supervision is based on regulatory rules, it is often referred to as the regula-
tory approach. Although the traditional regulatory approach is important
for reducing excessive risk taking by banks, it is no longer felt to be ade-
quate in today’s world, in which ﬁnancial innovation has produced new
markets and instruments that make it easy for banks and their employees
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bank that is quite healthy at a particular point in time can be driven into
insolvency extremely rapidly from trading losses, as forcefully demon-
strated by the failure of Barings in 1995. Thus an examination that focuses
only on the quality of the bank assets or whether a bank is following the
rules at a point in time may not be eﬀective in indicating whether a bank
will in fact be taking on excessive risk in the near future.
This change in the ﬁnancial environment for banking institutions has
resulted in a major shift in thinking about the bank supervision process
throughout the world to what is called the supervisory approach. In the
supervisory approach bank examiners focus less on compliance with spe-
ciﬁc regulatory rules and the risks of the ﬁnancial instruments currently in
the bank’s portfolio and more on the soundness of the bank’s management
practices with regard to controlling risk. This shift in thinking was re-
ﬂected in a new focus on risk management in the Federal Reserve System’s
1993 guidelines to examiners on trading and derivatives activities. The fo-
cus was expanded and formalized in the Trading Activities Manual issued
early in 1994, which provided bank examiners with tools to evaluate risk
management systems. In late 1995, the Federal Reserve and the Oﬃce of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) announced that they would be
assessing risk management processes at the banks they supervise. Now
bank examiners give a separate sensitivity to risk rating from 1 to 5 that
feeds into the overall management rating as part of the CAMELS system.
Four elements of sound risk management are assessed to determine the
sensitivity to risk rating: (a) the quality of oversight provided by the board
of directors and senior management, (b) the adequacy of policies and lim-
its for all activities that present signiﬁcant risks, (c) the quality of the risk
measurement and monitoring systems, and (d) the adequacy of internal
controls to prevent fraud or unauthorized activities on the part of em-
ployees.
This shift toward focusing on management processes is also reﬂected in
recent guidelines adopted by the U.S. bank regulatory authorities to deal
with interest-rate risk. At one point, U.S. regulators were contemplating
requiring banks to use a standard model to calculate the amount of capital
a bank would need to have to allow for the interest rate risk it bears. Be-
cause coming up with a one-size-ﬁts-all model that would work for all
banks has proved diﬃcult, the regulatory agencies have instead decided
to adopt guidelines for the management of interest rate risk, and bank
examiners will continue to consider interest rate risk in deciding on the
bank’s capital requirements. These guidelines require the bank’s board of
directors to establish interest rate risk limits, appoint oﬃcials of the bank
to manage this risk, and monitor the bank’s risk exposure. The guidelines
also require that senior management of a bank develop formal risk man-
agement policies and procedures to ensure that the board of directors’
14 Frederic S. Mishkinrisk limits are not violated and to implement internal controls to monitor
interest-rate risk and compliance with the board’s directives.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has also moved more
toward the supervisory approach in deciding on capital requirements. One
part of its June 1999 proposal allows banks to use their own credit risk
models for setting capital requirements, whereas the internal management
procedures that banks use to decide how much capital to hold would be
subject to supervisory review, after which in some circumstances banks
might be required to hold capital beyond the regulatory minimum. The
movement away from rules-based prudential supervision (the regulatory
approach) toward a more forward-looking supervisory approach will prob-
ably increase over time. However, bank regulations will still play a prom-
inent role in prudential supervision, not only because they are a ﬁrst
defense against excessive risk taking, but also because their existence pro-
vides supervisors with a stick they can wield to get banks to implement
proper risk management procedures.
1.5 What Are the Issues?
The framework used here to understand why prudential supervision is
needed and the forms that it takes can also be used to examine key issues
aﬀecting whether prudential supervision will work well in preserving the
safety and soundness of the banking system, the topic of this conference.
There are eight basic issues that we look at here, and the papers in this
conference volume have something to say about all of them.
1.5.1 How Restrictive Should a Regulatory Environment Be?
We have seen that prudential supervision often takes the form of re-
stricting bank activities, either by not allowing them to hold certain assets
or by restricting them from engaging in certain businesses. Although re-
stricting banks from certain activities may limit the opportunities for
banks to take on risk, this does not mean that doing so will always be ben-
eﬁcial or will promote the safety and soundness of the ﬁnancial system.
For example, those who are opposed to restrictions separating the bank-
ing and other ﬁnancial industries believe that allowing banks to enter these
industries would increase competition. Bank entry into securities under-
writing can lower the spreads between the price guaranteed to the issuer
of the security and the price paid for the security by the public, possibly
increasing the eﬃciency of securities markets (see Beatty, Thompson, and
Vetsuypens 1998 and Gande, Puri, and Saunders 1999). Bank entry into
insurance could create more eﬃcient networks to deliver insurance to con-
sumers, thereby lowering costs. Furthermore, the combination of banking
and nonbanking businesses under one roof could lead to more diversiﬁed
ﬁnancial institutions, which may thus be less likely to fail. Therefore, al-
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safety of the ﬁnancial system, rather than make it more fragile.
Proponents of the separation of banking from other industries such as
investment banking and real estate, which can be quite risky, believe that
allowing commercial banks to engage in this business might produce more
bank failures and a less stable ﬁnancial system. They are concerned also
about potential conﬂicts of interest if banks engage in underwriting securi-
ties. Congressional hearings in the United States prior to the enactment of
the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933 turned up abuses in which banks that were
underwriting new issues of securities sold them to trust funds they man-
aged when they could not sell them to anyone else, and these trust funds
often suﬀered substantial losses when the securities were sold later. Cases
also surfaced in which the bank would buy securities that it was underwrit-
ing when the securities could not be sold elsewhere. Proponents of the
separation of banking from other ﬁnancial industries worry also that the
extension of the safety net to these other industries will remove market
discipline and encourage risk taking in these industries, which could re-
duce their safety and soundness.
Proponents of abolishing the separation of banking from the securities
industries point out that the extent of underwriting abuses that occurred
before the passage of Glass-Steagall was probably exaggerated (Benston
1990), and regulatory authorities now have much greater power to ﬁnd and
punish people who would abuse commercial banking’s securities activities.
Empirical research suggests that conﬂicts of interest that would lead to
underwriting abuses are not a serious problem (see Ang and Richardson
1994; Kroszner and Rajan 1994, 1997; Puri 1994, 1996; Gande et al., 1997;
and Gande, Puri, and Saunders, 1999). Furthermore, the erection of ﬁre
walls to separate various bank operations can help prevent conﬂicts of
interest. Fire walls could also be useful in limiting the expansion of the
safety net to other businesses, including securities and insurance under-
writing.
A key issue for the design of prudential supervision is thus, what regula-
tory environment works best, and how restrictive it should be? The paper
by James Barth, Gerard Caprio Jr., and Ross Levine in this volume exam-
ines this issue by exploiting a unique data set they created at the World
Bank that documents the nature of the regulatory environment and restric-
tions in a panel of over sixty countries. Through statistical analysis, they
evaluate the links among diﬀerent regulatory/ownership practices, ﬁnan-
cial sector performance, and banking-system stability. They ask three ba-
sic questions and get the following answers.
First, do countries with regulations that impose tighter restrictions on
the ability of commercial banks to engage in securities, insurance, and real
estate activities have less eﬃcient but more stable ﬁnancial systems? Barth,
Caprio, and Levine uncovered no reliable statistical relationships between
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estate activities and the level of ﬁnancial development or industrial compe-
tition. However, they do ﬁnd that restrictions on banks engaging in securi-
ties activities tend to be associated with higher interest rate margins, sug-
gesting that these restrictions hamper eﬃciency. Furthermore, countries
with greater regulatory restrictions on securities activities of commercial
banks have a signiﬁcantly and substantially higher probability of suﬀering
a ﬁnancial crisis. The evidence in this paper thus suggests that regulatory
restrictions separating banking and other ﬁnancial industries, especially
the securities industry, are harmful. Allowing banks to enter the securities
industry not only promotes eﬃciency but can actually promote a more
stable ﬁnancial system. Evidence of the type in this paper can never be
conclusive, as Mark Gertler points out in the comment, but the paper
shifts the burden of proof to those who advocate separation of banking
and the securities industries to demonstrate harmful eﬀects of allowing
banks into this industry.
The second question Barth, Caprio, and Levine ask is whether countries
that restrict the mixing of banking and commerce have less eﬃcient but
more stable ﬁnancial systems. They do not ﬁnd that restrictions on mixing
banking and commerce hurt eﬃciency or ﬁnancial development, but they
do ﬁnd that these restrictions are associated with greater ﬁnancial instabil-
ity. Thus, one of the major reasons for restricting the mixing of banking
and commerce—to reduce ﬁnancial fragility—is not supported by the evi-
dence in this paper. This evidence, along with the evidence on the ﬁrst
question, weakens the case for more restrictive regulatory environments in
the banking system.
The third question asks whether having state-owned banks play a large
role in the ﬁnancial system leads to more poorly functioning ﬁnancial sys-
tems. They ﬁnd that the answer is yes because greater state ownership of
banks in a country tends to be associated with more poorly developed
banks, nonbanks, and securities markets. This result accords well with the
intuition of economists who believe that the private sector has much better
incentives to create ﬁnancial institutions that will make the ﬁnancial sys-
tem operate eﬃciently. This evidence also accords well with many econo-
mists’ recommendations that the government should not be in the ﬁnancial
business but should instead leave it to the private sector.
1.5.2 Limiting Too Big To Fail
As we have seen, the too-big-to-fail problem provides a particular chal-
lenge for prudential supervision. Governments are reluctant to let the fail-
ure of particularly large banking institutions cause losses for depositors
and often other stakeholders, because the failure is then more likely to
have a systemic eﬀe c to nt h eﬁnancial system, thereby precipitating a ﬁ-
nancial crisis. On the other hand, this reluctance increases moral hazard
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makes the ﬁnancial system more fragile. Thus a key issue for prudential
supervision is how to limit the moral hazard incentives for large banking
institutions.
The speech given at the conference by Lawrence Meyer, a governor of
the Federal Reserve System, addresses the issue of how the Federal Re-
serve System is approaching the supervision of what he calls large complex
banking organizations. This issue has grown in importance recently, with
the growth of ﬁnancial consolidation and the passage of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, both of which encourage the development of
larger and more complex ﬁnancial organizations. Meyer’s speech indicates
that the Federal Reserve has groups that are engaged in intensive study of
how best to supervise these large organizations and that the Federal Re-
serve’s thinking is taking two directions. First, there is a growing emphasis
on a supervisory approach in which examiners focus on the adequacy of
banks’ risk management and internal models to determine the amount of
capital needed to cope with market and credit risk. Second, there is in-
creased emphasis on the use of market discipline to create the right incen-
tives for these large, complex banking organizations.
In order to enhance market discipline, Meyer cites two steps that can
be taken. First are requirements to increase public disclosure of informa-
tion about residual risk in securitizations; the distribution of credits by
internal risk classiﬁcations; and concentrations of credits by industry, ge-
ography, and borrower. This disclosure should make it easier for the mar-
ket to judge whether these large banks are managing risk properly and to
pull out funds if they have concerns about the way the bank is managing
risk. Second, an increase in issuance by large banking organizations of
subordinated debt (junior debt that is paid oﬀ only after more senior
claims have been paid). This subordinated debt will subject them to in-
creased market discipline because subordinated debt holders have strong
incentives to monitor these organizations.
1.5.3 Market Discipline
The importance of market discipline and how it might work to promote
safety and soundness of the ﬁnancial system are themes present not only
in Meyer’s speech but also in the papers by Robert Bliss and Mark Flan-
nery and Charles Calomiris and Andrew Powell.
The term market discipline has often been used quite loosely in the lit-
erature, and Bliss and Flannery make the important point that the con-
cept of market discipline needs to be reﬁned if we are to understand its
eﬀectiveness. Bliss and Flannery distinguish between two aspects of mar-
ket discipline: (a) monitoring, in which investors are able to understand
changes in a ﬁrm’s condition accurately and incorporate these assessments
promptly into the ﬁrm’s security prices; and (b) inﬂuence, in which a secu-
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performance that might trigger a takeover.
rity price decline causes ﬁrm managers to respond by counteracting ad-
verse shocks. There is substantial evidence that markets are able to moni-
tor and reﬂect a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial condition in securities prices (see the
survey in Flannery 1998). On the other hand, there is very little evidence
in the literature on whether there is market inﬂuence in nonextreme situa-
tions.7 Without market inﬂuence in which market prices cause managers
to alter their behavior in normal times, market monitoring will not neces-
sarily limit managers of ﬁnancial institutions from taking on excessive risk.
Thus without market inﬂuence, market discipline will not work.
Bliss and Flannery study market inﬂuence by examining what happens
to the condition of bank holding companies after changes in stock and
bond prices in order to see if there is evidence that these price changes
aﬀect managerial actions. They do not ﬁnd convincing evidence of market
inﬂuence, but as is indicated in the paper and in the comment by Ragh-
uram Rajan, because securities prices may primarily reﬂect predictions
of future ﬁnancial conditions, managerial actions that counteract adverse
shocks may be extremely diﬃcult to ﬁnd in the data, even if this is exactly
what the managers are doing. Instead of indicating that market inﬂuence
is weak, the Bliss and Flannery paper demonstrates how diﬃcult it is to
use market prices to obtain evidence on the existence of market inﬂuence.
However, their paper suggests that without strong evidence for the ability
of markets to inﬂuence managerial actions, prudential supervisors should
retain responsibility for inﬂuencing managerial actions to restrict risk
taking.
In recent years, Argentina has undertaken a sweeping reform of its sys-
tem of prudential supervision, particularly in the aftermath of the tequila
crisis in 1994, by using greater reliance on market discipline to promote a
safe and sound banking system. The paper by Calomiris and Powell out-
lines what changes Argentina has made in its supervisory system and as-
sesses how well these changes have worked to create credible market disci-
pline of the banking system. The Argentine experience is worth studying
not only for the lessons it provides to emerging market countries, but also
for the lessons it may provide for industrialized countries like the United
States, which, as Meyer’s speech indicates, are considering increasing the
use of market discipline in their supervisory systems.
In the aftermath of the tequila crisis, Argentina adopted the Bonds,
Auditing, Supervision, Information, and Credit Rating (BASIC) system of
banking oversight, administered by the central bank. The main concept
behind this system is that market discipline and regulatory discipline are
each imperfect by themselves, but there is a strong complementarity be-
tween the two. The Argentines recognized, as Meyer does in his speech,
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a key feature of the BASIC system is increased disclosure of information
(the I in BASIC), including development of a credit bureau in which infor-
mation about all loans in the ﬁnancial system more than $50 in value are
made publicly available. Information disclosure is useful only if the infor-
mation is accurate. Thus another key feature of the BASIC system is the
supervisory authority’s standards and supervision of the auditing process
(the A in BASIC). To increase information, the BASIC system also has a
credit rating requirement (the C in BASIC), in which banks are required
to obtain credit ratings and disclose them to the public. To increase market
discipline, the BASIC system requires banks to issue subordinated debt
for 2 percent of their deposits each year (the B, for bonds, in BASIC). If
banks are forced to attract investors by going to the market and issuing
subordinated debt, this process reveals information about the bank to both
debt holders and supervisors. In addition, subordinated debt holders have
incentives to monitor banks and pull out their funds if the bank is taking
on too much risk. In addition to the elements just mentioned, which focus
on information and market discipline, the BASIC system has an important
role for supervision (the S in BASIC). The supervisory authority adopted
a version of the CAMELS system used in the United States and used
CAMELS ratings to set capital requirements.
Calomiris and Powell ﬁnd that although the BASIC system has worked
reasonably well, some elements are problematic. The subordinated debt
requirement, which was to be in place by January 1998, has not worked as
well as some of its advocates had hoped. The Asian crisis in mid-1997 and
the Russian crisis in the fall of 1998 made debt issues very diﬃcult for the
banks. Thus the central bank put back the compliance date for subordi-
nated debt requirements several times and weakened the requirement by
increasing the range of liabilities that banks could issue to satisfy the re-
quirement. In addition, the central bank has been unwilling to disclose
which banks have been unable to comply with the subdebt requirement.
However, the subdebt requirement has been beneﬁcial in that it is the weak
banks that have had trouble issuing subdebt and that there have been pen-
alties for noncompliance, giving banks incentives to decrease the riskiness
of their activities. The credit ratings requirement has also run into some
diﬃculties because obtaining the ratings appeared to be expensive and
because the ratings were not of uniform quality. The central bank has tried
to ﬁx these problems by asking banks to have only one rating to reduce
the cost, and the central bank has restricted the number of authorized
agencies to only internationally active ones.
On the whole, Calomiris and Powell give a fairly favorable assessment
of the BASIC system. Not only has the Argentine banking system grown
rapidly and withstood shocks from the Asian and Russian crises, but the
BASIC system also seems to have injected credible market discipline into
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bank default risk as measured by deposit interest rates and deposit growth,
and that deposit interest rates means revert quickly, especially after BA-
SIC was implemented. These ﬁndings, though subject to some criticisms
as indicated in the comment by Douglas Diamond, suggest that the market
can measure bank risk and punish banks that are riskier, and that banks
try to reduce risk after they are exposed to risk-increasing shocks. Calom-
iris and Powell thus provide a more encouraging view of the eﬀectiveness
of market discipline than do Bliss and Flannery. However, their assessment
of Argentina’s BASIC system does indicate that bank examination and
supervision still play an important role in promoting safety and soundness
of the banking system and that market discipline is not enough.
1.5.4 Limiting the Principal-Agent Problem in Supervision
An important impediment to successful prudential supervision of the
ﬁnancial system is the principal-agent problem, in which the agent (a regu-
lator or supervisor) does not have the same incentives as the principal (the
taxpayer it works for) and so acts in its own interest rather than in the
interest of the principal. To act in the taxpayer’s interest, regulators and
supervisors have several tasks, as we have seen. For example, they need to
set restrictions on holding assets that are too risky, to impose suﬃciently
high capital requirements, and to close down insolvent institutions. How-
ever, because of the principal-agent problem, regulators have incentives
to do the opposite and engage in regulatory forbearance. One important
incentive for regulators that explains this phenomenon is their desire to
escape blame for poor performance by their agency. By loosening capital
requirements and pursuing regulatory forbearance, regulators can hide the
problem of an insolvent bank and hope that the situation will improve, a
behavior that Kane (1989) characterizes as “bureaucratic gambling.” An-
other important incentive for regulators is that they may want to protect
their careers by acceding to pressures from the people who strongly inﬂu-
ence their careers—the politicians.
Limiting the principal-agent problem by making bank supervisors ac-
countable if they engage in regulatory forbearance is important to improve
incentives for them to do their job properly. For example, as pointed out
in Mishkin (1997), an important but very often overlooked part of
FDICIA that has helped make this legislation eﬀective is that the supervi-
sory agencies must produce a mandatory report if the bank failure imposes
costs on the FDIC. The resulting report is made available to any member
of congress and to the general public upon request, and the General Ac-
counting Oﬃce must do an annual review of these reports. Opening the
actions of bank supervisors to public scrutiny makes regulatory forbear-
ance less attractive to them, thereby reducing the principal-agent problem.
In addition, subjecting the actions of bank supervisors to public scrutiny
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supervision of banks.
Although limiting the principal-agent problem in bank supervision was
not the main focus of any paper in the conference, the Calomiris and Pow-
ell paper and the paper by Allen Berger, Margaret Kyle, and Joseph Scalise
do have some useful things to say about this issue. Calomiris and Powell
point out that an additional beneﬁt of the subordinated debt requirement
in Argentina is that it helps monitor bank supervisors: Failure to comply
sends a signal that can discourage regulatory forbearance. When a weak
bank fails to comply with the subordinated debt requirement, the super-
visors cannot easily claim that they were unaware of the bank’sp r o b l e m s
because the market has provided a clear signal of its lack of conﬁdence in
the bank. The presence of the subordinated debt requirement thus avoids
plausible deniability by supervisors, which makes it more likely that they
will close down a weak bank or take actions to encourage it to return
to health.
One question examined in the Berger, Kyle, and Scalise paper is whether
supervisors got tougher during the 1989–92 period and then got easier in
the following 1993–98 period. Although Berger, Kyle, and Scalise found
some limited evidence that supervisors were tougher in the 1989–92 pe-
riod, they found even stronger evidence that bank supervisors eased up on
banks during the 1993–98 period. This ﬁnding of easing in the 1993–98
period is particularly interesting because it was during this period that
there was tremendous political pressure on supervisors to relax standards:
Politicians claimed that supervisory actions during the 1989–92 period
were to blame for creating the “credit crunch” that put a signiﬁcant
damper on the economy. In 1993, supervisors formally recognized a prob-
lem of credit availability and began a joint program directed at dealing
with this problem, taking actions designed to alleviate the apparent reluc-
tance of institutions to lend. The results of this paper thus suggest that
despite the supposed independence of bank supervisors in the United
States and provisions in FDICIA to reduce the principal-agent incentives
for supervisors to relax standards, bank supervisors in the United States
might still be responsive to political pressure—although an alternative
view is that they were just trying to respond appropriately to a problem
in the economy. The paper’s results thus suggest that the principal-agent
problem may not have been completely solved in the United States despite
eﬀorts to do so.
1.5.5 Reﬁning Capital Requirements
The Basel Accord on capital requirements was developed to make capi-
tal requirements responsive to the amount of credit risk borne by the bank.
Over time, limitations of the Basel Accord have become apparent because
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credit risk weights can diﬀer substantially from the actual risk the bank
faces. For example, a loan to a AAA-rated corporation receives the same
100 percent risk weight (i.e., 8 percent capital requirement) as a highly
risky loan to a CCC-rated corporation. As a result, banks may engage in
what is called regulatory (capital) arbitrage in which they end up substitut-
ing riskier assets in their portfolio for safer assets that have the same risk
weight. Thus risk-based capital requirements like the Basel requirements
may end up encouraging risk taking by banks rather than limiting it. In
his speech Meyer notes this problem and worries that the incentive to
arbitrage economic and regulatory capital will increase, giving regulatory
capital less and less meaning.
A key issue for eﬀective prudential supervision is whether capital re-
quirements can be reﬁned so that requirements ensure that banks have
adequate capital to deal with the amount of credit risk in the bank’s activi-
ties. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999) has outlined
two potential approaches to credit risk capital requirements for consider-
ation: (a) a revised, standardized approach similar in style to the current
requirements that leaves in place many of the distortions that lead to capi-
tal arbitrage, and (b) an internal ratings approach in which required capi-
tal would be computed using formulas based on internal credit risk ratings
done by the bank. Over the longer term, a move to an internal models
approach, similar to that used for market risk, may be possible. Under
this approach banks’ internal models would be used to calculate the risk
requirement. The internal ratings and internal models approaches would
attempt to get regulatory capital requirements to match economic capital
more closely. The internal models approach takes a supervisory approach
to capital regulation because the bank would make decisions about the
models used, and then the supervisory authorities would monitor these
models to see if they are reasonably accurate and follow best practice.
The internal ratings approach has more elements of a regulatory approach
because the parameters and architecture of the system would be set by
regulators, although supervisors would still monitor the bank’s procedures
for determining the internal ratings.
For the two new approaches to risk-based capital requirements to get
regulatory capital close to economic capital, so that regulatory arbitrage
would be minimized, technical knowledge about what portfolio character-
istics and factors are important in exposing the bank to credit risk is cru-
cial. Mark Carey’s paper conducts Monte Carlo simulation exercises to see
which asset or portfolio characteristics and types of behavior substantially
expose the bank to risk and whether a linear structure, in which diﬀerent
credit risks are added up independently, accurately reﬂects total credit risk
for the bank. The basic ﬁndings of this work, and also the results from
Prudential Supervision 23similar work done at the Bank of England, reported in the comment by
Patricia Jackson, are that credit risk is substantially inﬂuenced by the fol-
lowing factors: borrower default ratings, estimates of likely loss given a
default, and measures of portfolio size and granularity (the extent to which
loans to a few borrowers make up a large fraction of the portfolio). In
addition, the linear structure that is inherent in the internal ratings ap-
proach seems to produce reasonable estimates of overall credit risk for the
bank. This research is useful both to banking institutions that need to
develop their own internal models to assess credit risk and to supervisors
who may have to evaluate these internal models or regulators who might
be designing an internal ratings approach to credit risk–based capital re-
quirements.
1.5.6 How Are Regulations Produced?
Economic analysis is useful for designing regulation to achieve certain
objectives, and many of the papers in this conference are attempts to pro-
vide exactly this analysis. However, even when economists reach a consen-
sus about what form regulation should take, we often see that the real
world produces something quite diﬀerent. For example, almost all Ameri-
can banking economists have agreed for over two decades that abolish-
ing restrictions on branching across state lines would not only improve
the eﬃciency of the banking sector, but would also increase diversiﬁcation
and make the banking system more stable. Despite this consensus, it was
only in 1994, with the passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Eﬃciency Act, that these restrictions were ﬁnally abolished.
Why does it take so long for welfare-enhancing reforms to get imple-
mented, and what ﬁnally leads to passage of these reforms?
The paper by Randall Kroszner and Phillip Strahan looks at this ques-
tion by using a political economy approach to analyze why regulations
evolve as they do and what forces lead to passage of legislation that
changes regulations. They analyze voting patterns in congress on three
amendments to the FDICIA of 1991 and ﬁnd that private interests are a
key determinant of votes on banking regulations, although partisanship
and ideology also play an important role. Although the ability of their
private-interest model to explain individual votes is impressive, Jeremy
Stein points out in his comment that their model of interest group compe-
tition and battle among private interests may not be quite as good at ex-
plaining regulatory outcomes as the regression results indicate. The prob-
lem is that median votes and not individual votes determine whether
legislation is passed, so that accurate prediction of individual votes may
not always translate into accurate prediction of whether legislation is actu-
ally passed.
Nonetheless, Kroszner and Strahan’s results do provide important clues
as to why particular legislation passes at some times but not at other times.
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share of small banks, the traditional beneﬁciaries of branching restric-
tions, which weakened their ability to block interstate branching reform.
Their results thus suggest how to think about getting desirable regulatory
reforms passed. If legislation is designed to dissipate the eﬀorts of diﬀerent
private interests against each other using a divide-and-conquer strategy,
these private interests are less likely to support narrow special interest leg-
islation. This research thus suggests how economists can increase the polit-
ical sophistication of their recommendations (i.e., how to skin the cat) to
address the interests of diﬀerent constituencies to make passage of welfare-
improving legislation more likely.
1.5.7 Where Should Bank Supervision Be Done?
Countries have made diﬀerent choices about which government agen-
cies are responsible for prudential supervision. Some countries like Argen-
tina have bank supervision housed entirely inside the central bank. Others
completely separate the monetary policy function and bank supervision
function and give no supervisory role to the central bank. In the United
States, the Federal Reserve does have a supervisory function, but shares it
with other supervisory agencies at both the state and federal levels.
In their paper, Joe Peek, Eric Rosengren, and Geoﬀrey Tootell focus on
an economic consideration for where supervision should be done that has
been largely neglected in discussions about the design of the bank supervi-
sory structure. Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell show that there is a synergy
between the supervisory and monetary policy functions because informa-
tion provided by bank examinations helps increase the accuracy of macro-
economic forecasts. Forecast accuracy of macroeconomic variables is es-
sential to the monetary policy function because successful monetary policy
is necessarily forward-looking. Without accurate macroeconomic fore-
casts, monetary policy makers cannot know which values are the right
ones to set for their policy instruments in order to achieve their goals.
Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell examine recent proposals in the United
States for redesign of the bank supervisory system to see which of them
gives the Federal Reserve the most useful information to improve macro-
economic forecasts relevant for monetary policy. They ﬁnd that supervi-
sory information from banks regulated by the Federal Reserve does im-
prove macroeconomic forecasts of inﬂation and unemployment rates, but
the greatest improvement comes from supervisory information on state-
chartered banks that are typically supervised by the FDIC or the OCC.
Thus the authors’ results might indicate that there is a potential cost to
monetary policy if the central bank is excluded from participation in bank
supervision, or even if the central bank is limited to supervising only the
largest institutions.
In his comment, Ben Bernanke raises the issue—which the Peek, Rosen-
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eration for where banking supervision should be done is not the improve-
ment of monetary policy, but rather whether supervision promotes ﬁnan-
cial stability. He argues that bank supervision needs to be in the central
bank in order to facilitate the central bank’s role as lender of last resort.
The Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell paper sparked a lively discussion by the
participants in the conference about whether bank supervision should be
inside the central bank, and there were many diﬀerent views expressed on
this issue.
An interesting issue raised by the Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell paper is
whether there are other ways for information to be shared by supervisory
agencies, so that even if it is not engaged in supervision the central bank
still gets the supervisory information that helps it improve the accuracy of
its macroeconomic forecasts. Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell suggest that
hands-on experience is necessary for the central bank to get the supervi-
sory information it needs, a view echoed by Alan Greenspan in a quote
cited in the paper. However, diﬀerent institutional designs of the relation-
ship of the central bank with outside supervisory agencies may enable the
central bank to get the information it needs, and this could be an interest-
ing topic for future research.
1.5.8 Banking Supervision and the Aggregate Economy
Although the primary purpose of banking supervision is to promote
ﬁnancial stability, supervision can also have ancillary eﬀects on the aggre-
gate economy by aﬀecting bank lending. There is a large literature sug-
gesting that the capital crunch that occurred in the late 1980s and early
1990s—due to loan losses that ate away bank capital and increased capital
requirements—led to a credit crunch in which bank lending was re-
stricted, with a negative eﬀect on aggregate demand that slowed down the
economy (e.g., Bernanke and Lown 1991; Federal Reserve Bank of New
York 1993; Berger and Udell 1994; Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise 1995;
Hancock, Laing, and Wilcox 1995; Peek and Rosengren 1995). The paper
by Berger, Kyle, and Scalise provides further evidence of the potential im-
pact of prudential supervision on the aggregate economy by looking at
whether supervisors changed their toughness during the 1989–92 credit
crunch period and in the 1993–98 period following, and whether these
changes in toughness had an impact on aggregate bank lending.
As mentioned earlier, Berger, Kyle, and Scalise do ﬁnd some limited
evidence that bank examiners became tougher in the 1989–92 period, but
they found even stronger evidence that bank examiners eased up on banks
during the 1993–98 period. They then ﬁnd that these changes in supervi-
sory toughness did aﬀect bank lending behavior in the expected direction,
with increased toughness leading to a contraction in lending and easing to
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small, suggesting that changes in supervisory toughness do not explain
much of the dramatic changes in aggregate bank lending over the last
decade or so. This evidence suggests that changes in supervisory toughness
can have eﬀects on the aggregate economy that might be important infor-
mation for monetary policy makers who may want to adjust policy instru-
ments because of these eﬀects. However, as pointed out in the comment
by Stephen Cecchetti, the measured eﬀects that Berger, Kyle, and Scalise
ﬁn dm a yi np a r tr e ﬂect changes in the general economic environment,
rather than changes in supervisory toughness per se. It should also be
noted that because Berger, Kyle, and Scalise do not look at all the channels
through which changes in bank balance sheets aﬀect the aggregate econ-
omy, their results do not rule out potential large cyclical eﬀects from capi-
tal requirements on the aggregate economy.
1.6 Conclusions
This chapter has tried to show that getting prudential supervision right
is extremely important to the health of the economy. The papers following
in this volume have many interesting things to say about some of the key
issues in prudential supervision. They will hopefully provide results that
can help guide policy makers in enhancing the eﬀectiveness of prudential
supervision in the future.
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